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Recently there has been much interest in discrete forms of Brownian ratchets, using a game-
theoretic formalism. Using the approach pioneered by Parrondo, we develop a new method for
obtaining the stationary probabilities and probability current for the case of discrete-time and
discrete-space ratchets. We then use this result to calculate the Parrondian ratchet efficiency in two
cases: firstly, for Parrondo’s original system and, secondly, for a set of probabilities derived from a
discretized ratchet potential.
PACS numbers: 05.40.Ca
Since the field of Brownian ratchets acquired its impor-
tance, there have been numerous studies on the energetics
of these microscopic devices [1, 2]. Parrondo [3] devised
a discrete-time and discrete-space version of the flash-
ing ratchet model [4] within a game-theoretic framework,
and recent work has established the connection between
game probabilities and physical variables that describe
the motion of a Brownian particle [5]. For extensive re-
views of this area that show the relationship of the Par-
rondo effect to classical random walks, quantum walks,
fractal pattern formation and spin systems, for example,
see [3]. The significance of game-theoretic approaches in
physical systems has recently been reviewed [6] and the
Parrondo effect in transport processes has recently been
discussed [7]. There is also emerging interest in the so-
called continuous-discrete interface [8], and the Parrondo
approach is also of relevance in that arena.
The original Parrondo’s paradox involves the alterna-
tion of two games. The first game, game A, has a winning
probability given by p = 12−ǫ. It is easy to check that for
ǫ = 0 game A is fair, whereas for small ǫ game A turns
into a losing game. Game B is a capital dependent game,
where the winning probability depends on the capital of
the player being multiple of three or not. If the capital is
multiple of three the winning probability is p1 =
1
10 − ǫ,
otherwise it is p2 =
3
4 − ǫ. As in the case of game A, for
ǫ = 0 game B is a fair game, and a losing one for ǫ > 0.
This set of probabilities can be summarized as,
p =
1
2
− ǫ, p1 =
1
10
− ǫ, p2 =
3
4
− ǫ. (1)
Parrondo conjectured that this system is a discrete form
of the flashing ratchet, and this has recently been rig-
orously demonstrated within a Fokker-Planck frame-
work [9]. However, finding the correct formalism for
describing the efficiency of the discrete ratchet and re-
lating it back to the continuous case, has been problem-
atic [10]—this has motivated a solution, which is now
presented for the first time in this paper.
The flashing ratchet consists of a Brownian particle un-
der the influence of a potential that can be switched on
and off either stochastically or periodically. Its dynamics
can be described through the following Langevin equa-
tion, x˙ = −V ′[x(t)] · ζ(t) +Fext+D[x(t)] · ξ(t), where (i)
ξ(t) accounts for white noise, (ii) ζ(t) is a form of dichoto-
mous noise that switches on (state B) and off (state A)
the potential V (x), and (iii) Fext is a force acting on the
particle, that can be exerted by an external agent. It is
required that the potential has a certain degree of spatial
asymmetry in order to obtain directed motion from these
fluctuations. Usually a ratchet-like potential is used,
V (x) = V0
(
sin
(
2πx
L
)
+
1
4
sin
(
4πx
L
))
, (2)
where V0 denotes the amplitude of the potential and L
its spatial periodicity. Although other similar potentials
perform the same task, Eq. (2) is convenient for analyti-
cal purposes.
The corresponding set of Fokker-Planck equations re-
lated to the Langevin equation that describes the tran-
sitions of the particle between states A and B are [4],
∂PA(x,t)
∂x
= −∂(JA(x,t)PA(x,t))
∂x
− ωA→BPA(x, t)
+ ωB→APB(x, t)
∂PB(x,t)
∂x
= −∂(JB(x,t)PB(x,t))
∂x
− ωB→APB(x, t)
+ ωA→BPA(x, t),
where PA(x, t) (resp. PB(x, t)) denotes the probability
of finding the particle in state A (resp. B) at a given
position x and time t. The term ωα→β accounts for the
transition rate between state α and β. The probability
currents JA and JB are given by
JA(x, t) = FextPA(x, t) −
∂(D(x)PA(x,t))
∂x
JB(x, t) =
(
Fext −
∂V (x)
∂x
)
PB(x, t)−
∂(D(x)PB(x,t))
∂x
.
In the stationary regime we have PA(x, t) = PA(x)
and PB(x, t) = PB(x). The current in this regime is
2ω
ωA B
ωAB
1− 1−ωAB BA
BA
FIG. 1: State transition diagram between games A and B.
constant [4] and given by J = JA(x)+JB(x). With this
in mind, and using the same notation as in [5], we propose
a model that describes the dynamics of the capital of the
player when alternating between games A and B. The set
of Master Equations (ME) describing this process are
PAi (τ + 1) = (1− ωAB)[a
i
−1P
A
i−1(τ) + a
i
0P
A
i (τ)
+ai1P
A
i+1(τ)] + ωBA[b
i
−1P
B
i−1(τ) + b
i
0P
B
i (τ)
+bi1P
B
i+1(τ)] (3)
PBi (τ + 1) = (1− ωBA)[b
i
−1P
B
i−1(τ) + b
i
0P
B
i (τ)
+bi1P
B
i+1(τ)] + ωAB[a
i
−1P
A
i−1(τ) + a
i
0P
A
i (τ)
+ai1P
A
i+1(τ)]. (4)
The terms PAi (τ), P
B
i (τ) account for the probability
that the player plays game A or B with a capital i at time
τ respectively. Also the term ai−1 (resp. b
i
−1) denotes
the probability of winning if the player plays game A
(resp. B) with a capital (i − 1); ai0 (resp. b
i
0) is the so–
called self–transition probability, that is, the probability
that the player will remain with the same capital after a
round played for a given capital i; and finally ai1 (resp. b
i
1)
is the probability of losing when the player has a capital
(i + 1) and is playing game A (resp. B). The transitions
between game states are shown in Fig. 1.
In order to preserve normalization, Eqs. (3) & (4) must
accomplish the condition
∑
i[P
A
i (τ)+P
B
i (τ)] = 1 for the
stationary probabilities, and ai+1−1 +a
i
0+a
i−1
1 = 1 together
with bi+1−1 +b
i
0+b
i−1
1 = 1 for the transition probabilities in
games A and B respectively. Making use of the normal-
ization condition for the transition probabilities, Eqs. (3)
& (4) can be rewritten in the form of continuity equations
for P iA(τ) and P
i
B(τ) as
PAi (τ + 1)− P
A
i (τ) = (1 − ωAB)[a
i
−1P
A
i−1(τ)−
(ai−11 + a
i+1
−1 )P
A
i (τ) + a
i
1P
A
i+1(τ)] − ωABP
A
i (τ) +
+ωBA[b
i
−1P
B
i−1(τ) + b
i
0P
B
i (τ) + b
i
1P
B
i+1(τ)]
PBi (τ + 1)− P
B
i (τ) = (1 − ωBA)[b
i
−1P
B
i−1(τ) −
(bi+1−1 + b
i−1
1 )P
B
i (τ) + b
i
1P
B
i+1(τ)] − ωBAP
B
i (τ) +
+ωAB[a
i
−1P
A
i−1(τ) + a
i
0P
A
i (τ) + a
i
1P
A
i+1(τ)]
where the lhs of both expressions must equal zero, in
the stationary regime. These equations, combined with
the normalization condition for the stationary probabili-
ties, form a set of equations that must be solved for the
variables PAi , P
B
i for each i. For the case of Parrondo’s
games it is necessary only to consider the 0, 1 and 2 states
due to the presence of a modulo three periodicity. There-
fore, in matrix form we must solve the C · P = U, where
P = {PA0 , P
A
1 , P
A
2 , P
B
0 , P
B
1 , P
B
2 }
T , U = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}T ,
and
C =


1−A0 − ωAB 1 + (1− ωAB)q
A
1 1 + (1− ωAB)p
A
2 1 + ωBAr
B
0 1 + ωBAq
B
1 1 + ωBAp
B
2
1 + (1− ωAB)p
A
0 1−A1 − ωAB 1 + (1− ωAB)q
A
2 1 + ωBAp
B
0 1 + ωBAr
B
1 1 + ωBAq
B
2
1 + (1− ωAB)q
A
0 1 + (1− ωAB)p
A
1 1−A2 − ωAB 1 + ωBAq
B
0 1 + ωBAp
B
1 1 + ωBAr
B
2
1 + ωABr
A
0 1 + ωABq
A
1 1 + ωABp
A
2 1−B0 − ωBA 1 + (1− ωBA)q
B
1 1 + (1− ωBA)p
B
2
1 + ωABp
A
0 1 + ωABr
A
1 1 + ωABq
A
2 1 + (1− ωBA)p
B
0 1−B1 − ωBA 1 + (1− ωBA)q
B
2
1 + ωABq
A
0 1 + ωABp
A
1 1 + ωABr
A
2 1 + (1− ωBA)q
B
0 1 + (1− ωBA)p
B
1 1−B2 − ωBA


,
and where Ai = (1 − ωAB)(p
A
i + q
A
i ) and Bi = (1 −
ωBA)(p
B
i + q
B
i ). The solution can be obtained through
P = C−1 ·U. The analytical solutions for PAi and P
B
i are
too lengthy to be presented here—however, we will show
some results concerning the original Parrondo’s games A
and B. As we already stated before, these games are al-
ternated using a mixing probability γ. This means that
independently of the previously played game, we have al-
ways a probability γ of playing game A and a probability
1 − γ of playing game B, in the next round. It can be
easily checked that the latter condition is equivalent to
ωAB = 1− γ and ωBA = γ.
Making use of the previous expressions for ωAB, ωBA
together with the set of probabilities already defined in
Eq. (1), and by letting η = −169+11 γ2+16 ǫ− 240 ǫ2−
2 γ (11 + 8 ǫ), we obtain the following expressions for the
stationary probabilities for game A and B
PA0 =
−5 γ η2
η
PA1 =
2 γ η3
η
PA2 =
2 γ η4
η
(5)
PB0 =
5 (γ−1) η2
η
PB1 =
−2 (γ−1) η3
η
PB2 =
−2 η4
η
. (6)
where η2 =
(
13 + γ2 − 8ǫ+ 16ǫ2 + 2γ (−1 + 4ǫ)
)
,
η3 =
(
−13 + 4γ2 − 6ǫ− 40ǫ2 + 3γ (−7 + 2ǫ)
)
and η4 =(
−39 + 4γ2 − 6ǫ− 40ǫ2 + γ (5 + 6ǫ)
)
They are expressed in terms of the mixing probability
γ and the biasing term ǫ. In Fig. 2 we plot both station-
ary probabilities PAi , P
B
i versus the mixing probability γ
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FIG. 2: Plot of the evolution of the stationary probabilities
for game A and game B versus the mixing variable γ. The
inset shows that the sum of both probabilities, P Ti = P
A
i +
PBi , agrees with the expressions obtained for the stationary
probabilities Π0, Π1, Π2 obtained for the mixed game AB.
for the simplest case ǫ = 0. The inset in Fig. 2 shows the
total probability PTi = P
A
i + P
B
i for each state, that is,
the probability of finding the capital of the player mod-
ulo three (PT0 , P
T
1 , P
T
2 ) considering both games A and
B. These values are compared with the stationary proba-
bilites Π0, Π1, and Π2 obtained through a Discrete-Time
Markov Chain (DTMC) analysis [12]. Fig. 2 confirms
that both probability sets fully coincide.
The total current, as in the continuous case, will be
constant in value (that is, independent of capital i), J =
JAi + J
B
i , where J
A
i = p
A
i · P
A
i − q
A
i+1 · P
A
i+1 and J
B
i =
pBi ·P
B
i − q
B
i+1 ·P
B
i+1. For obtaining the average gain, we
must multiply the current J with the periodicity M of
the games, which in our case is M = 3, and so G = 3J .
Simulations reveal excellent agreement with a theoretical
plot of G versus γ.
Now we have a method for obtaining the stationary
probabilities PAi , P
B
i , we turn to the problem of evalu-
ating efficiency for our discrete-time system. But firstly,
we introduce a result from [5], where a method is pre-
sented for obtaining a potential, given a set of proba-
bilities defining a game. Its most important property is
that the potential obtained is unbiased if a game is fair,
and biased otherwise (with a positive slope if the game
is losing and negative if winning). The equation used for
calculating the potential is,
Vi = −
i∑
j=1
ln
( pj−1
1−rj−1
1−pj−rj
1−rj
)
. (7)
It can be checked that if our probability set
{p1, p2, . . . , pL−1} describes a fair game, that is,∏L−1
i=1 pi =
∏L−1
i=1 qi, then the potential is periodic V0 =
VL. It also works the other way around. If we have a
discretized potential Vi, and we are interested in obtain-
ing its related probabilities, we can make use of Eq. (7)
solving for the probabilities {pi, ri, qi} (see [5] for further
details).
This previous result allows us to evaluate the efficiency
in two different cases. On one hand, given two probabil-
ity sets defining games A and B, we will obtain their
related potentials using Eq. (7) and then the efficiency
can be derived. On the other hand, we can calculate the
efficiency given two potentials, from which we can obtain
their respective probability sets inverting Eq. (7). For
the latter case, we use a flat potential for state A, that
is, VA = 0, and state B, VB will be obtained from Eq. (2)
with L = 3.
In [11] a new expression for the efficiency is presented.
It is based on a new definition of the energy output Eout:
‘. . .We define the energy output Eout of an engine as the
minimum energy input Ein required to accomplish the
same task as the engine.’ The novelty of this definition is
that permits the evaluation of the efficiency for a Brow-
nian particle even in the absence of an external load F .
So we can evaluate the energy output (or Pout) using
the expression, Pout = P
min
in = Fext · v + γv
2. Recall-
ing that in our system, v = J · L and γ = 1, we obtain
Pout = FextJL + J
2L2. This is the equation to be used
for determining the energy output of our system.
The energy input of the system is the energy that we
must supply to the system when switching between the
two potentials. For evaluating this energy input in our
system we need a potential related to each of the two
games. Therefore, if we are dealing with probabilities
defining our games A and B, we will make use of Eq. (7)
for obtaining the potential for each game. The energy
input can be calculated theoretically by means of a prob-
ability flux balance. In the stationary regime, the net
flux from a given game, say game A, and state i, towards
the other game B and the same state i can be calculated
through the difference equation JnetAB(i) = J
A
i−1 − J
A
i =
(pAi−1P
A
i−1− q
A
i P
A
i )− (p
A
i P
A
i − q
A
i+1P
A
i+1). Clearly the net
current JnetAB(i) equals the opposite current from game B
to game A, that is, |JnetAB(i)| = |J
net
BA(i)|, where J
net
BA(i) =
JBi − J
B
i−1. The input power can now be obtained and is
given by Pinput =
∑L−1
i J
net
AB(i) · (VB(i)−VA(i)). For the
simplest case when Fext = 0, for the original Parrondo
games, we obtain η = 1.1078 · 10−2 for γ = 0.36. For the
alternation with the potentials VA and VB , we obtain a
maximum value for the efficiency of η = 1.061·10−3 when
γ = 0.35. The system possesses a low efficiency mainly
because it works in an irreversible manner, far from its
equilibrium state. The magnitude obtained for the effi-
ciency agrees with other studies for the on-off ratchets
[1, 13]. Now that we have obtained an efficiency met-
ric, it now provides a basis for comparing different Par-
rondian or discrete-time ratchets, and provides a basis in
the search for higher efficiency systems.
Now we evaluate the efficiency, when Fext 6= 0, which
is difficult when considering alternation between games
A and B. Clearly, the applied external force Fext must
bias the potential with a slope equal to −Fext. Whereas
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FIG. 3: Plots of the efficiency versus the external forcing Fext
for two cases: a) Alternating the original Parrondo’s games A
and B with different mixing probability γ. From top to bot-
tom: γ = 0.4, 0.2, 0.6, 0.8. b) Alternating between the poten-
tials VA = 0 and VB for a value of γ = 0.45. The plot includes
the curves for different values of the amplitude V0 for the po-
tential VB, from top to bottom: V0 = 0.45, 0.4, 0.35, 0.3, 0.25.
For both graphs the theoretical curves are the solid lines and
the numerical values are the circles.
it can be demonstrated that the biasing parameter, ǫ,
introduced earlier in Eq. (1), is exactly equivalent to Fext
only for the case of game A—due to the non-constant
values of the probabilities in case of game B, ǫ is no longer
equivalent to the force.
Because of this, we proceed as follows: given a set
of probabilities {pi, ri, qi} defining our game B, through
Eq. (7) we calculate its discretized potential Vi. Then,
for Fext 6= 0 we add this extra bias through V
new
i =
Vi−Fext ·i, where i denotes the state. Finally the new set
of probabilities will be obtained inverting Eq. (7), using
the new values for the potential {pni , r
n
i , q
n
i }. If we want
to calculate the efficiency when alternating between the
potentials VA and VB , we need only to add the slope to
these potentials and then invert Eq. (7) for obtaining the
probability sets. In Fig. 3a, the efficiency for the original
Parrondo’s games is evaluated for different values of the
mixing probability γ. It can be appreciated that the
efficiency attains a maximum value for a value of Fext 6=
0, that corresponds to a lower value for the current than
in the case of Fext = 0. This effect also has been found in
other models, for example in [13]. In Fig. 3b we compare
theoretical and numerical simulations for the efficiency
when alternating between the potentials VA and VB . We
have obtained the efficiency for different values of the
potential amplitude V0 for the potential VB . As in the
previous case, the efficiency also attains a maximum for
a value of Fext 6= 0.
In conclusion, for the first time we provide a method
that permits an analytical solution for the stationary
probabilities PAi , P
B
i , and the average gain G = 3J of a
player that alternates between two games A and B with
different transition probabilities ωAB, ωBA. Using this
approach, we then evaluated the efficiency in the case of
the original Parrondo games, as well as for a given set of
potentials VA, VB , both of them sharing the essential fea-
tures with the continuous model of a flashing Brownian
ratchet.
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